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PREFACE
There is a legend told about a dog which started to cross a bridge with a
small bone in its mouth. About midway across, it stopped to view the water
flowing in the stream below. Thinking the reflection in the water was in
reality another dog with a larger bone, and thinking to better itself, it immediately plunged into the water, aiming directly for the bone. We who stand on
the bank viewing this drama know the dog was foolish, that he lost the bone
he had and risked the danger of ending up in deep water with little chance of
climbing the steep banks which lead to safe ground.
In this study I am only an observer. From my point of view I see the
American free enterprise system threatened. by "foolish" plunges into
socialism, during which our precious freedoms and heritage are lost, and then
immersing ourselves in bureaucratic waters from which we must escape or
perish. Many are not yet convinced that we are in danger or that this danger
exists in the water industry. I'm not sure the words I have used in this report
will warn or convince, but this has been my sole purpose in writing.

I am not a rescuer-only an observer. I take full responsibility for statements made. My only hope is that, as Americans, we will take a little more
basic look at our government oriented water institutions and attempt a rescue
before we leap further into total darkness.
Frank W. Haws
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PART I
PURPOSE OF STUDY
This study has been concerned with the human organizations that have
been devised to manage water resources. Because the effort was to suggest
some alternative methods to solve the problems of institutional restraints to
effective water use, certain horizons have been viewed which extend beyond
the limits of the ordinary water domain. Some of the concepts which will be
discussed here pertain to the world and apply equally to all human activities,
not exclusively to water. The purpose in doing this is to give more realistic
meaning to the alternatives suggested and to hopefully define the real
purposes and objectives of water related organizations.
Emphasis is placed on the word "organization;' because it is felt that the
way in which groups band together; the structure, regulations, and motivation
built into the organization, determines whether the group will effectively meet
its goals, how efficiently it will operate, and whether it is a valuable social organ.
The proliferation of water resources organizations that exist within a
given area is a restraint to effective utilization of water resources and a
hinderance to desirable overall basin planning and management. The
awareness of this problem was made known in a previous study (Haws, 1973).
To organize is a necessity, but organizations have as much difficulty
communicating with each other as individuals have, and hence many
organizations competing for the same resource often bump heads and in the
aggregate become ineffective social tools.
Since water in manageable form does not occur uniformly over the
earth, it follows that there will exist places with an oversupply to meet the
needs of the local users and places with an undersupply. When such a
condition exists naturally, and the area of abundance is spaced far from the
area of scarcity, it may be too costly for man to attempt to reorder the
natural water equilibrium. However, there are many places even within the
generally less abundant areas where allocation by man could improve upon
nature if it were not for barriers placed in the way by social or legal
institutions. Often the allocation is not between spatially separated areas but
between types of uses. Reallocation, or transfers from areas of abundance to
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areas of scarcity, or from one use to a more profitable use, is prevented by
some type of barrier or boundary such as a property line, a water right, an
administrative decision, a legal entanglement, a municipal or district limit, or
a government policy. Cost in such reallocations is not usually a restraint, but
the alternatives to crossing the barrier or boundary are costly and often lead
to over-investment in diverting works, transmission systems, and management
organizations.
All of the barriers mentioned have one thing in common. They stem
from some type of institution or organization. The solution then to a better
utilization of water resources, of extending supplies to the limit, and of the
proper timing of importation and other "new water" investments is in the
organization. Physical schemes are meaningless until the proper organization
is invented, and with the right organization the physical schemes will follow
like a sucking calf-not in obedience to law or dictum but vuluntarily to
fulfill a need.
This study is, therefore, a study of institutions-or more precisely,
organizations. The intent at the beginning was to suggest ways of "modernizing" the existing organizations so that more effective use of the water
resource could be implemented. Such a task now seems quite formidable. In
the first place, if modernization implies an acceptance of the more recent
trends toward big and powerful government agencies, then such a suggestion
would not improve upon the present system. Big government is neither
efficient nor effective. In the second place, many of the existing organizations
do not have the internal capacity to effect change or to innovate, and at the
same time many of these same organizations have been endowed with eternal
life and seem destined to "live forever in their sins." Some organizations live
on long after they have ceased to be effective social organs. Finally, the
multitude of organizations which compete but which do not communicate or
cooperate would not respond to an external suggestion to "get with it."
Responsibility goes with authority and at that point in space or time where
an organization's authority ends, so also does responsibility. To expect the
multitude of organizations to accept responsibility for total resource
development in an effective way is pure folly.
Despite the formidable task of suggesting changes that might be made
to improve the organizational structure of the water industry, some
suggestions will be made; but the hoped for impact of this study will not be
on the mechanics of how to organize, but rather on the principles and criteria
which should be observed when creating new organizations. All too often new
organizations are formed with no forethought as to the real purpose of the
organization and with little or no regard for the fact that human nature plays
a vital role in every organization or the fact that society is dynamic and
continually changing. Much of this stems from the fact that no believable
theory of organization has yet been stated and also from the fact that
2

pressure, urgency and excitement yield to unwise decisions and the birth of
organizations. This is particularly true in the water industry where governmental organizations have been the most widely accepted solution, and where
fear has been the prime motive.
PHYSICAL VS. SOCIAL

Efficient and effective use of the natural water resource of an area is
dependent upon the proper use of knowledge acquired in two important
areas. The first area includes the understanding of the physical system and the
laws of nature which control the occurrence, distribution, and disposition of
water as it moves through the hydrologic cycle. Contributions to this
knowledge area have come from many disciplines including meteorology and
atmospheric science, physics, chemistry, hydrology, hydraulics, geology,
plant science, soil science, statistics and probability, and other disciplines
which attempt to explain phenomenon involving water. Progress has been
made over the years and the misunderstandings which mystified earlier ages
have been largely dispelled. In addition to the general concepts of the unity
and continuity of the hydrologic cycle, knowledge specific to given
watersheds and river systems has become available or can be made available in
order to test the feasibility of alterations imposed by ma!l. With present
knowledge available, engineers can design alterations to the physical system
which can efficiently regulate and redistribute the water resource to meet the
quantity, quality, and timing requirements for given purposes. Whether the
alterations are effective it!. meeting societies needs is determined by how
effectively knowledge in the second area is used. This area includes the
understanding of human nature and the institutions and organizations made
by man to construct and operate facilities to manage the water resource so
that it can satiSfy I!pecified needs with respect to amounts, timing, and
qUality. Contributions to this area of knowledge have been less exact, less
scientific, and less coherent than contributions to the physical state. In fact,
it is doubtful if any deliberate attemPt has been made, or can be made, to
unify the thoughts of philosophers, religionists, socialists, psychologists,
economists, lawyers, and politicians into a theory of organizations or to
perfect a system whereby organizations and institutions could be designed to
insure performance and effectiveness. The work of physical scientists working
independently and without direct communicative intercourse and without
agency direction, control, or correlation always tends toward a common
understanding of physical truth. This is as it should be if each discovers a part
of the truth. One would also expect the work of the social scientist to
converge to a common understanding if the "scientists" in this knowledge
area were also discovering truth. This may be happening in some areas of
social need but h~ not yet taken place in the area of organizational theory.
Organizations are just allowed to happen without sound direction or advice.
In the water industry, local initiative, which has had the freedom to create
organizations, has done so in a haphazard fashion, chOOSing those types of
organizations which have been difficult to change and which, with the passing
3

of time have had an adverse effect on development and allocation. Bain et al.
(I966), in a study of California's water organizations, has observed that,
Local initiative ... can lead to the development of a haphazard or
capricious pattern of local agencies supplying irrigation water-a pattern
with probable adverse effects both on the allocation of water among lands,
uses, and users, and on the efficiency of the exploitation of water
resources.
. . . an unplanned historical process has resulted in the allocation of rights
to the use of economically scarce water among users, uses, and sites in a
haphazard fashion which could only by unlikely coincidence approximate
an economically efficient allocation.

One of the major purposes of the research conducted under this project
was to suggest some alternatives to the existing institutional patterns as they
relate to the inefficient use of water within the State of Utah. The writer
soon discovered that no alternative would have meaning unless it could be
predetermined that the suggested changes would actually respond in the
desired manner. This led to a search for a theory of organizations which
would explain why organizations perform or not perform and define some of
the principles which must be observed if effective social organs are to be
created. That this information is not readily available is evidenced by the fact
that the haphazard method of forming organizations continues and that no
debate, particularly by public officials, is ever directed toward proving the
effectiveness of one form of organization over another or to post the
warnings necessary to avoid organizational mistakes. Occasionally some
citizen generated debate may take place over optional forms of local
government, but since the great American love affair with big government
began in the 1930's legislators seldom if ever debate the merits of
governmental organization versus non-governmental organization as a better
means of accomplishing a social need. The debate is always over what kind of
governmental organization will be created. This is like two painters discussing
what color to paint the room, when if they stepped outside, they would
discover they were in the wrong house. Legislators today seem to never step
outside to gain the greater perspective.
Solving this organizational problem is not easy, because, unlike the
physical environment, it is not a case of man studying physical phenomena,
but of man studying himself and being hampered by a non-objective
viewpoint. The theories which attempt to explain the physical world are
widely accepted and are sufficiently close to the truth as to be workable.
Space travel, computers, television, and the other marvels of electronics are
evidence that man is beginning to explain the physical world. There is no
similar unity of theory which attempts to explain man's social world. The
"scientific" disciplines which study man's social, political, and economic
activities have not yet agreed upon unified workable theories. Social,
political, and economic evaluations are still made on the basis of comparison
and educated "opinion" -tempered in some cases by sophisticated analysis.
4

Continued poverty, crime, social unrest, dissension, recession, and inflation
all attest to the failure of these "sciences" to solve the problems of social and
economic wen being. Part of the problem which somehow has evaded critical
analysis must be attributed to the organizational "systems" which have
developed over the years. These systems have "set" the thinking of large
masses of people, overriding personal ideologies and individual wills and
forcing unwise social decisions. It is the purpose of this report to discuss these
problems in the light of what the writer believes are fundamental principles,
and then to specifically relate this to water organizations in the State of Utah.

OPEN OR CLOSED SOCIETY
There are essentially two opposing social philosophies each of which
has real social benefits. The first, or open society, is highly individualistic and
places great importance on personal freedom. Each individual is free to make
his own decisions, to move freely within the system, and to compete in a free
market for goods and services. This personal autonomy releases human
initiative and creativjty and gives the individual a sense of personal dignity,
but the society thus created is lacking in union among its members and
therefore has the inability to give vigorous leadership and intelligent direction
to the cause of social and economic well being. Union can only be obtained
through voluntary covenants or contracts, otherwise the principle of freedom
is restricted or destroyed.
The second or closed society is socialistic or paternalistic, having as its
primary role the regulation and direction of the lives of its members,
supposedly in their interest and for their good. The members are regulated,
disciplined, and regimented to the society's causes or goals. Action within the
system is controlled by rules and procedures which are backed by the force of
law and the police power of the state. The benefits of the closed society are
unity, a feeling of common goals, and a sense of belonging and security.
These benefits, however, are achieved by suppressing personal freedom which
in turn curtails initiative and destroys human dignity. Because of this, the
system is generally inefficient, costly, and unproductive.
Perhaps the most serious and intense debate over the merits of the two
philosophies occurred at the time of the forming of the United States
Constitution. A choice had to be made, because there was no apparent way
that the benefits of each could be attained. Freedom spawns many ideas and
opinions, therefore little union of thought and purpose. Forced or organized
union means suppression of freedom. Wisely the framers 'of the Constitution
chose the open or free society and devised an ingenious system of
government, based upon what they termed "self evident truths," to preserve
and perpetuate it. The unity necessary to bind the people to one government
is secured by covenant. Officials taking office are required to give their oath,
a free choice, that they will uphold and defend the Constitution, and the
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citizens in turn freely pledge allegiance and support to the same. Realizing
that human beings are not always honest or moral and are subject to selfish
motives, particularly when endowed with power, a system of checks and
balances was designed into the system to hopefully prevent the unwise use of
authority.
During the first half of the nineteenth century society in the United
States was, excluding slavery, essentially free and open. One of the freedoms
available was the right to organize, or to form into groups so that the
combined effort of many could be channeled into given purposes. Union for
the purpose of achieving social needs was thus possible through the use of
voluntary associations. The role of the government was limited to one of
preserving peace and administering justice.
UNION THROUGH ORGANIZA nON

The first attempts at organization during this period were generally
experiments in social brotherhood such as "cooperatives" and "societies."
Many failed because the basic ideology or "truth" upon which the
organization rested was not sufficiently vital to keep members excited. In an
otherwise free society, the only recourse an organization has when members
fail to comply with organizational standards is expulsion from the society.
When forceful means are resorted to, the society ceases to be free.
The potential that organization had for accomplishing desired purposes
began to be recognized during this early period, but the multiplication of
enduring organizations didn't get its big push until after the Civil War. The
early beginnings, however, were described enthusiastically by a Boston cleric,
William Ellery Channing. In 1829 he wrote,
In truth one of the most remarkable circumstances or features of our age is
the energy with which the principle of combination, or of action by joint
forces, by associated numbers, is- manifesting itself. It may be said, without
much exaggeration, that everything is done now by societies. Men have
learned what wonders can be accomplished in certain causes by union, and
seem to think that union is competent to everything. You can scarcely
name an object for which some institution has not been formed.
(Channing, 1829, p. 105-106)

Many of the social experiments begun during that period failed. The
differences that separated complete freedom and complete union could not
be reconciled. But the benefits and powers associated with organized groups
were manifest and the use of organizations in many different areas multiplied
until today, nearing the third quarter of the 20th century, literally thousands
of organizations exist. Organizations are so common and numerous today
that perhaps the effects they have upon society are often overlooked.
Whether an organization is a threat to individual freedom and open society or
whether it contributes to social well being and the preservation of liberty
depends upon the type of organization.
6

ORGANIZATION CREATES POWER
Associations of living things exist because of some kind of power
relationship. An organization, when well structured, creates power. The more
perfect the organization, the greater the power. This potential power is the
reason why people associate together-to accomplish through the unity of
many what one could not do alone. But, the purpose of an organization is not
to create power, but to use power.
Organizations cannot exist without people. Therefore the real subject
which needs study is people-human beings-not as groups but as individuals.
It is not the group that senses light and darkness, or experiences sickness and
health, or feels pleasure and pain. It is not the organization that laughs and
cries. It is the individual. It is also the individual that achieves and fails, works
and rests, lives and dies. It is the individual and not the organization that
houses that elusive thing called life. To preserve it and enhance it, man
hopefully creates institutions, or organizations. An organization is therefore
only a means to an end. An organization uses the power it creates to
accomplish a predetermined purpose. Organizations are not or should not be
ends in themselves.
Philosophies differ, but the writer supports the view that the purpose of
life is not merely to survive but to gain happiness, and happiness in contrast
to misery can only be measured by the internal feelings of the individual not
by the outward expressions of a group. There may be expressed signs of
happiness that others may observe, there may be principles or laws of
happiness which man can discover and codify; but the only one who can
measure and control happiI).ess by exercising choice, is the individual.
The basic needs of life are food, clothing, and shelter, but the individual
needs more than phYSical comfort. He needs association and acceptance with
other people, an inner sense of belonging, a sense of his own importance and
of his ability to produce. He needs productive work and he needs to achieve.
He needs to learn through experience to choose those things which contribute
to his happiness and to reject those things which make him sad.
Each individual also needs to be reassured that the self-evident truths
proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence are still valid and still
self-evident. Every individual should expect the government to protect his life
and his person from the ravages of war or invasion and from the criminal acts
of his neighbors. He should expect to be granted the full use of his
faculties-his arms and legs and voice to move about, work, and express
himself and not to be restrained or imprisoned unjustly, and he should expect
to be able to own and to hold the property, real or otherwise, he needs in
pursuit of his happiness. Because life is dynamic, each individual is
continually changing, continually becoming the type of person he chooses to
be and overcoming the person he deems to be undesirable-but always by his
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own choice. Not always does he make the right choice and so he seeks help.
Organizations like the family, church, school, or club can assist the individual
to learn, understand, and to experience, so that he makes better choices; but
no person, organization, or government can give, grant, bequeath, or force
happiness upon individuals. Happiness, the purpose of human life, can only
be acquired through the proper and wise use of individual choice. The key
word is choice-with freedom to choose for one's self. Organizations must,
therefore, be formed with due regard for the effect the organization has upon
freedom of the individual.
Organizations, then, are merely tools designed to make it easier to
accomplish an otherwise difficult task. If the task has been completed the
tool is no longer needed and should be discarded. If the tool is not effective
in accomplishing the task, it should be modified or exchanged for a better
one. If the task has no social benefit, no tool should be designed, and no
effort should be expended to perpetuate a tool which has no task to perform.
The above statements are obvious, but when we consider that the tool we
speak of is a collection of people, managed by people; and bound together by
dynamic economic or social pressures, we begin to realize that, as a tool,
organizations are complex and can be problems.
POWER CAN BE MISUSED
It has been previously stated that when people associate together for a
given purpoSe that power is created. Not only is it created, but because an
organization has leadership, power is concentrated. In fact, concentration-on
a specific task or purpose emerges as the key to the strength, performance,
and legitimacy of organizations. But concentration of power in one individual
or a small group of individuals, should be viewed very cautiously and perhaps
even feared. The history of mankind is replete with examples of misuse of
power. In fact it can be stated as a true principle that most men when given
power and authority, tend to misuse that authority for selfish or unsocial
purposes. The men associated with the U.S. Constitution were keenly aware
of this and thus tried to implement checks and balances into the new
government. James Madison shows his understanding of this principle when
he said, "All power in human hands is likely to be abused." Lord Acton was
even more convinced when he said that "all power corrupts," and "absolute
power corrupts absolutely." Nothing has happened since these words were
first written to make them less true today. Therefore, one problem all
organizations face is how to cope with power and the potential misdirection
it induces.

The tendency to misuse the power associated with position is a fact of
life that must be recognized as an important element in all organizations. If
leaders become affected by the power of the position they hold, and elect to
direct the organization into paths unsuited to social good, the members of the
8

organization need to have some kind of recourse. In a business organization
this has taken the form of counter pressures directed by organizations of
workers or unions. The resultant power struggle has caused laws to be enacted
and the police power of the state to intervene. The attendant loss of freedom
and the use of compulsory direction has lessened the effectiveness of the
business organization. In government this recourse is either built into the
political system through free elections, or comes through external means such
as revolution and rebellion.
There is another selfish nature in man which must also be accounted
for. This is the reaction man takes toward money. The accumulation of
wealth beyond the ordinary needs of the individual or organization can tempt
the man or the organization to purchase special privileges or favors, to
influence legislation, to sway judicial opinion, or to subjugate the rights of
others. This weakness in human nature gives rise to such ominous expressions
as, "every man has his price," and "anything in this world can be purchased
for money." The corporate business enterprise probably best solves this
problem by distributing surpluses to many small ownerships and by being
accountable to a free market system for survival. It is not without abuse,
however. Organizations like labor unions concentrate large sums of money
into a few hands whose acco)lntability in terms of effective production is
nebulous and perhaps unmeasurable. This has attracted a criminal element
into their leadership and serious abuse of power. Government agencies are not
exempt from this problem either, where it manifests itself in a cancerous
system of dishonesty among modestly paid employees who have power to
grant favors, contracts, licenses, etc.
Another problem inherent in organizations is related to the effect the
organization has upon its own members. Whenever an individual becomes a
part of an organization he necessarily gives up some of his own individual
freedom. If the organization controls the individual's economic means it also
has power to control the individual. One of the Federalist writers expressed it
as, "control over a man's support is control over his will." In a more modern
context the same principle was expressed by Rufus Miles of HEW and has
since been labeled "Miles Law." He said that, "where you stand depends on
where you sit." What this really says is that a man's position on any
important issue will be shaped less by his own philosophy than by the goals
of the organization he represents or the needs of the office he holds. This
control of an organization over a man's will is not a conscious effort on the
part of individuals to dQminate, but a built in function of the "system." In an
ideal situation, the conscience and will of the individual coincides with the
goals and purposes of the organization. In other situations, unless the
individual has attractive alternatives, he will bend his standards and silence his
conscience in order to retain position, prestige, or income. Even though the
goals of the organization he serves contributes negatively to society, he yields
to these goals. The individual is not to be condemned though for his action.
9

The fault is in the system. Probably the best example of such system
subserviency is found in the bureaucratic service agencies of government
where the organization has ceased to be a means to an end and has become an
end in itself.

EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS
Throughout this report the words efficiency and effectiveness will be
used frequently. It is important that the meaning intended be defined.
Efficiency has different meanings in different disciplines but, in general,
efficiency is a scaler term which represents the ratio between the input and
output energies of a process. Thus, an engine is efficient if the energy output
is high with respect to the energy input; an irrigator is efficient if the water
consumed by his crops is high with respect to the water applied; and an
economy is efficient if the value received is high with respect to the cost. It is
obvious that efficiency is a product of management and technology-of using
knowledge in such a way that friction, loss and waste are minimized.
Effectiveness on the other hand, is not related to input-output ratios,
but to final product. Effectiveness means producing results, but only those
results which were planned and visualized at the outset and which have social
value or purpose. Thus, a farmer may efficiently use his input resourceswater, labor and capital-to produce 50 bushels per acre of a new type of
noxious weed seed. He will not be considered effective because the crop he
produced has no value either to himself or to society. Effectiveness, like
efficiency is a product of management, but in this case, wisdom is needed to
set the goals and priorities and determine the purposes. A wise farmer does
not intentionally harvest weed seed! Peter Drucker (1974) stated this concept
precisely when he defined efficiency as doing things right and effectiveness as
doing the right things. The first takes knowledge, the second wisdom.
Unfortunately, wisdom is in short supply.
Efficiency, when applied to organizations, is measured in terms of
dollars of cost per unit of product. If things are done right the costs of
production will be lower than if things are not done right. Efficiency then
becomes a problem for managers and a job for accountants. Whether the
product has value (effectiveness) must be judged by some other system.
Efficiency can be motivated by the pressures of competition, whether it be
competition in a free market for goods and services, or whether it be
competition with other agencies for a slice of the government budget.
Effectiveness means doing the right things. Therefore the test of what is
right cannot come from within the organization. Determining one's own
effectiveness is called self-justification and is merely a magnification of one's
own reasons for existence or for continuing to do the things one is doing.
Survival is not the end for which an organization was formed. Effectiveness
10

therefore, must be determined by some means external to the organization.
The judgment should be clear cut and decisive and available to management
so that changes can be instituted if necessary. The only real justification for
having an organization is to produce results-to accomplish the ends for
which it was formed. If it is not producing, it is ineffective and should be
made effective by either increasing efficiency or changing programs. A
program that cannot be made effective should be abandoned.
Some types of organizations are more effective than others. The
effectiveness seems to be coupled strongly to the manner in which the
organization is paid. Business, for example is paid for what it produces. It is
paid for perfornlance and results. In a free market system the test of
effectiveness for business is whether the consumer is willing to buy. If a
consumer has a free choice with alternatives to choose from and chooses to
buy a certain product-the producer of that product has been effective in
making the right thing. His efficiency in producing and his continuance in
effectiveness is measured by a simple mechanism called profit and loss.
Business represents the best example there is of an organization whose
effectiveness is measured externally and in such a manner that management
can respond almost immediately to effect changes to maintain effectiveness.
A loss is an indicator that something is wrong. Continued loss can soon
exhaust the resources of the company and bring an end to the business. A
business must do right things or cease to be a business.

PROFIT AND LOSS
A business must also be able to react rapidly to changing conditions.
The environment in which a business operates is dynamic and subject to
frequent change. New technology, rapidly increasing population, urbanization, and other changes that influence consumer preference, all affect
business in a manner that can spell profit or loss depending on how well
management responds to change. Fortunately business organizations are
designed to manage change. In fact, business, the only type of organization
that is paid for performance, is the only organization designed to manage
change. It is forced into this position because of the law of opposites. It has
two choices: it can exist or not exist-live or die, depending upon whether it
makes a profit or a loss. Too often people forget that profit has its
opposite-loss, and the probability of a loss is greater than the probability of
a profit. The so called "profit motive" is not, therefore, a synonym for greed,
but merely the instinct for survival. To live or die is the question. Profit
means life for the business, loss means death. Staying alive, when the decision
is in the hands of the consumer, demands efficiency and ingenuity on the part
of the managers. It means doing things right and it means doing the right
things.
11

The profit-loss system of business organization operating in a free
society is the most productive, most efficient, and most democratic system
yet devised by man. It produces only those items wanted by the consumer, it
exacts a cost only from those who benefit, and it allocates the resources of a
nation only to those uses which have social need. And it does all this
automatically, unless interfered with by the controls imposed by government.
Despite the many advantages of a profit-loss system, public confidence in the
system has deteriorated in recent years. One of the reasons the profit-loss
system has come under ridicule and why some business men actually
apologize for profit is that the managers and economists have labored under
the false premise that profit is a motive for business and should therefore be
maximized. Profit is not a motive, but a test of performance and the premium
for the risk of uncertainty. It is what makes economic progress possible by
investment in new jobs and it is what pays for the economic satisfactions and
services of a society. The theorem of profit maximization has caused business
to aim at what is possible rather than of what is desirable and in doing so has
caused business to be less than socially responsible. Business does have the
responbility to make a profit, but only the minimum profit is required to
cover its own future risks, the profit to enable it to remain in business, and to
maintain intact the wealth-producing capacity of its resources. To define a
minimum profit is to assign social responsibility to business and requires
careful analysis by management as to what business it should be engaged in. A
socially responsible free enterprise system is possible.

ALWCATION BY BUDGET
In contrast to those organizations which are paid for performance
through a profit-loss system are those organizations that are paid out of a
budget allocation and a non-profit, non-loss system. These organizations are
allocated revenues from a source which is not tied to what they are dOing, but
obtained by tax, levy, assessment, or tribute. Governments naturally fall into
this division and as long as they confine their activities to "governing" this is
a legitimate way of being paid. The purpose of government is to "govern";
that is to control, regulate, or restrain. Therefore, the organization of
government is deliberately designed to prevent change. Government was not
designed nor intended to be a "doer" except in its role as protector and
defender. Armies and police forces must necessarily be paid out of a civilian
controlled budget. To do otherwise would result in a competition to prove
which army could win the most wars at the least cost. This would be gross
misdirection. When government departs from its function of governor and
defender and gets into the business of doing, the budget system fails to
function.
Judging the effectiveness of budget paid organizations is difficult, if not
impoSSible. Being paid for performance directs toward performance-but
being paid by a budget allocation directs toward a budget. Therefore
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performance in a budget allocated organization is the ability to maintain or to
increase one's budget. And the budget, by definition is not related to
contribution but to good intentions. There is no such thing as loss in budget
allocated organizations-only miscalculations in estimating or over expenditures due to unforeseen circumstances. A manager does not have an internal
indicator like a profit-loss statement to tell him when the organization is not
performing or misperforming. This means that the organization is extremely
resistant to change and finds it difficult to abandon an ineffective program. In
fact, it seldom knows that it is ineffective.

COST RECOVERY
There are other types of institutions or organizations that seem to
function somewhere in between a budget system and free profit-loss
enterprises. These are those enterprises that are paid for the costs incurred
and which provide a service that is essential to the user and cannot be
provided by a substitute. Hospitals and universities fall into this category. No
adequate test of effectiveness is available for this type of organization, and
therefore management for effectiveness is difficult. Judging a university by
the number of Ph.D.'s awarded may be a misdirection and produce a negative
effect upon society. Likewise, which is the most effective hospital, one with
all beds full, or one with few beds occupied? Should a hospital teach
preventive medicine or over treat the sick? Is a hospital a tool merely for the
doctors or does it have other functions? If it has other functions how are the
costs recovered? The direction any organization takes is linked to the way it
is paid. Paying just for costs directs toward increased costs until the user
rebels and seeks an alternative.
Organizations can therefore be evaluated on the basis of how they are
paid. If a market situation exists, that is, if choices are available to a
consumer, the result will be performance. This is inherent in a free enterprise
system because being paid for performance directs toward performance.
Similarly, a budget based operation tends not to perform because being paid
by a budget directs toward the budget. And being paid for costs directs
toward increasing costs. These principles apply regardless of ownership of
property. The socialist nations who insist on government ownership of
property are now finding that performance is still best obtained by paying for
performance. Paying a worker for lifting a sack of potatoes will direct tpward
lifting the sack of potatoes-no more. Performance in a competitive market
means using more than muscle, it means using ingenuity, thought, and vision.
It means unleashing creativity and initiative. This is perhaps the greatest
argument there is for a free market system. Profit is not a dirty word, but
only a numerical system of measuring the effectiveness of a business choice,
and of directing effort toward performance.
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WHAT IS OUR BUSINESS
An organization should be a means to accomplish some end. The
success or effectiveness of the organization depends primarily on how well
this "end" or purpose is defined. TIle organizational structure is important
but is patterned to meet the intended purpose of the organization; therefore
structure should not be considered until the purpose has been fully and
adequately stated. Strategy before structure should be the motto of all
organizations.

Defining the purpose or "business" of the organization is too often
glossed over or given inadequate attention. Simple as it may seem, defining
the "business" is not easily done. To be most effective the decision as to what
the purpose is must be made by the manager of the organization. The one
who has authority to direct, concentrate, and establish priorities must have
the proper vision of his job or he will most likely misdirect. Attempts to
establish purposes outside of the management circle automatically creates a
communication gap that is difficult to cross, and the result again is often
misdirection. TIlis is one of the problems of government services and agencies
when the purpose, so called, is stated by a legislative body and the
organization structured and regimented before anyone really knows what is
expected to be accomplished. The business world does not have this type of
harness placed upon it and therefore succeeds or fails on the basis of how well
management envisions its destiny. The articles of incorporation of a business
organization do not state the effective purpose of the business, but only give
it license to function.
In order to be effective an organization must be able to concentrate its
forces and resources upon specific tasks which contribute to the overall ends
of the organization. If the purposes of the organization are not well defined,
the leadership of the organization will find it difficult to decide which tasks
are important and which tasks should be avoided as being wasteful. The
important tasks will automatically be defined if the overall purposes are
clearly understood. Not all organizations are able to make such a clear
distinction of their purposes, however.
A management technique has been suggested by management consultant, Peter Drucker (l974), to assist organizational leadership in defining
its purposes in such a way that specific tasks are automatically suggested.
Each manager, regardless of whether his official title is president, director,
administrator, or manager, should ask himself this question: "What is our
business and what should it be?" and then thoughtfully answer it. The answer
can only come after careful analysis and there may not always be one right
answer, but a decision has to be made and the vision so clearly represented
that everyone in the organization can contribute to its realization. Drucker
(l974) said:
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Only a clear definition of the mission and purpose of the business makes
possible clear and realistic objectives. It the foundation for priorities,
strategies, plans, and work assignments. It is the starting point for the
design of managerial structures. Structure follows strategy. Strategy
determines what the key activities are in a given business. And strategy
requires knowing what our business is and what it should be.
Common vision, common understanding, and unity of direction and effort
of the entire organization requires definition of "what our business is and
what it should be."
Nothing may seem simpler or more obvious than to know what a
company's business is. A steel mill makes steel, a railroad runs trains to
carry freight and passengers, an insurance company underwrites fire risks, a
bank lends money. Actually, "what is our business?" is almost always a
difficult question and the right answer is usually anything but obvious.

Drucker goes on to indicate that a business's purpose is first defined by
the needs of the customers and this first step in determining purpose is to
define who the customers are. Thus the first part in analyzing the purposes of
the organization is to step outside of the organization and look at its activities
from the viewpoint of a customer, or as a recipient of its products or services.
Entrepreneurial imagination is helpful at this stage to catch the proper vision.
Examples of successful attempts to so define a business are seen in the Sears
Roebuck story where the purpose of becoming the "buyer for the American
family" has made Sears the largest retail business in America, and in the Bell
Telephone story where nationalization of the industry was averted because
Thomas Vail saw the purpose of the telephone company as "service" and his
customers as including the state regulatory agencies. The examples given here
illustrate the nature of abstract statements of purpose which point the
direction of the business and which lead to the formulation of specific work
objectives. Also, the statements do not confine the business to specific tasks
like "making steel."
Every organization should analyze its reason for being and attempt to
define what its "business" is, even those organizations which may consider
themselves to be "non-business" organizations. Government service agencies,
universities, hospitals, irrigation companies, and water conservancy districts
could well benefit from an analysis of why they exist and for what purposes
or ends they are supposed to be the means of achieving. Even these types of
organizations have "customers" which, if identified, might assist the
organization to adjust effectively to the part of the question that asks, "what
should our business be?"
One problem a government service agency has in answering the
question, "what is our business and what should it be?" is that the agency is
structured and the purpose described by legislation in legislator's language,
and leaves the "manager" without authority to act and without reason to
question. There is, therefore, no common vision, no common understanding
and unity of direction and effort, and no foundation for priorities, strategies,
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plans and work assignments. It is little wonder that government service
agencies are poor "doers."
Water services organizations have traditionally been government oriented-some with taxing authority and some without-none have ever been
truly "businesses." Even the private irrigation companies are not businesses.
None have ever, therefore, had occasion or the ability to ask themselves the
question "what is our business (purpose) and what should it be?" These
questions need to be asked, though, if only by the public and customers who
pay the bills. Perhaps this is the first step before reprivitizationl can take
place.
WATER-A DIFFERENT RESOURCE

Water as a resource is unlike all other natural resources. Despite man's
consistent use and reuse for over 6000 years, the total quantity and quality
remains the same-water cannot be created or consumed. Unlike the forest it
cannot be replenished by seeding; unlike oil or coal it cannot be diminished
by burning; and unlike a mineral resource it cannot be processed and parts
consigned to a waste pile. Unlike all other resources water exists everywhere-in the atmosphere, on the surface, in the ground, or stored in the
tissues of plants and animals. Water has innumerable uses. Besides quenching
a thirst, water performs thousands of tasks utilizing its ability to be a solvent,
a cleanser, a lubricant, an agent of transport, an agent of energy transfer
including mechanical and thermal, and the uses derived by medical therapy
and recreation. Water is associated with all the life processes of man and is
truly indispensable.
The properties of water that give it so many uses are also the properties
that make it difficult to manage. Within the narrow temperature range
existing on the earth's surface, water exists in all of its forms, solid, liquid and
vapor, and is constantly changing phases as energy from the sun is absorbed
or reradiated by the earth. Large masses of water in vapor stage are carried by
the winds for many miles and distributed as liquid in random fashion as
influenced by the sun's angle, elevation, or position on the earth with respect
to the land and liqUid water masses. Thus an uneven distribution of liquid
water occurs over the land masses of the earth and man has to go to the
sources-the rivers, the lakes, the springs, and underground to fill his dipper
and- satisfy his wants.
Despite the awesome nature of water as a universal resource, the
consumer in today's society is usually unconcerned with all its attributes. His
chief concern is that water flows from his tap upon demand. He has come to
1 Reprivitization is a term used by Drucker (1969) to mean a return from governmental to private organizations.
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expect this and is willing to pay the reasonable cost he is charged. But
bringing water from the stream or lakes or wells to the home requires
organization and effort. As a community has grown from a small initial
settlement to a megalopolis the number and variety of organizations has also
grown. Little thought and no integrated planning has gone into the formation
of these organizations until today a haphazard array exists. The hydrologic
unity of the water service area has sometimes been disected and divided until
apparent absurdities have appeared. It is possible that continued growth will
eventually demand a consolidation and removal of inefficiencies. Expert
planning at that point in time will be needed to make sure consolidation will
not worsen the situation.
The problem, then in an area where water supplies are overtaxed by
growth is to invent an organization that can combine all the resources into a
unity, can allocate the water to the use that is most efficient economically,
and be efficient and effective without becoming imperialistic. Formation of
such an organization must resist the temptation to rush into a governmental
agency and first answer the question-"What is the business of such an
organization and what should it be?"
The manner in which the question is answered will determine the
strategy to be used which will then allow organizational structures to be
designed. Answering the second part of the question gives a reevaluation to
determine if the right choices have been made. This is the "repentance" part
of organization which is often unused. Consider, for example, what would
happen if one wanted to create an organization to be the developer and
distributor of a state's water resources. If, in answer to the question, "what is
our business," the term "water conservation" was used what would be the
resulting organization? (The term "conservation" does not have the same
meaning to all people so it is doubtful if a common understanding would
exist throughout the organization so immediately the organization is directed
toward ineffectiveness.)
The word "conservation" means the carefully planned preservation or
protection of something, in this case, water. It also means the prevention of
exploitation, destruction or neglect of a natural resource. With this
connotation the work of the new organization would be to protect and to
control, two bona fide functions of government. But this organization would
have another function which is not governmental, that of building and
operating the facilities needed to develop and distribute the water. It is likely
that the governmental system would be adopted in this case and a
government agency, supported by accompanying laws and funded from taxes,
created. Later, as evidenced by history, it would be seen that the agency was
not a good doer, that it was costly, unresponsive, and arbitrary, and that it
made wrong social decisions. It would be too late then to ask the second part
of the question, what should our business be; because the agency would be
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entrenched with a vested right to the tax dollar and could not be divested or
terminated. If the question had been asked earlier, however, a different,
organization could have resulted.
If the word "service" had been substituted for conservation, a different
picture would have unfolded. Service means to be a servant, to aid, benefit or
contribute to the welfare of others. There are two reasons why this is not a
governmental function. One is that service requires someone to be a recipient
of the service, a master-servant relationship. The recipient or master must
have a choice of whether to accept the service and to also dictate the kind of
service desired. Government gives no choice to the recipient. Another reason
that government cannot function as a servant, except to protect and defend,
is that the type of interchange proposed is conducive to favors taking,
bribery, and discrimination. The interchange is therefore, not free but
controlled by strict and inflexible rules. This prevents true "service." The
organization resulting from an answer of "service" to the question would
have been non-governmental, in other words, a business. Since business is a
proven doer, and since the user of the business is master, the organization is
responsive, less costly, and makes decisions which meet social needs. If
management sets goals to meet a determined minimum profit, social
responsibility is more nearly assured and social impacts of the organization
more certainly recognized and provided for.
Water does not acquire economic value until it is used. It is not a
commodity that can be stored in a vault and still retain value. Its value lies in
its use. The farmer uses water to protect his crop from dessication and to
permit the plant growth processes to occur; the householder uses water to
drink, to cook, to clean, and perhaps with energy added, to heat and to cool.
The municipality uses water to put out fires, flush the street of debris, and to
transport human wastes out of town. Industry uses water in processes
necessary to the production of goods. All uses require a constant availability
and often a continuing supply with respect to time. No use is completely
static-all are dynamic and require water in motion. In all, the hydrologic
cycle becomes channeled through the user.
The only way in which the user can be placed within the hydrologic
cycle is to alter the natural flow system and physically divert the stream to
the place of use. This requires energy and organization. It would be absurd to
think each user would have to be a diverter. Hence, the pooling of uses into
one diverting and conveying system becomes the obvious answer. To this end
many organizations have been formed. The ultimate purpose of each
organization is the same-to get water from the place where nature has
concentrated it to the place of use, preserving or creating the quality and
pressure needed for the use. This is a service and whether the use enhances
the business productivity as with an irrigated farm or car wash, or whether
the use is just a convenience as with the urbanite who "rakes" his leaves with
a jet from his hose, it is the service the user pays for.
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The services concept has been foreign to most if not all of the
water-diverting-conveying organizations formed to date. Particularly is this
true with the agricultural organizations-the irrigation companies. How would
the irrigation companies answer the question, "what is our business-who are
our customers?" In actual practice the irrigation company manager has never
asked this question, but if he were to carefully analyze the function of the
company and how it came into being as a single legal entity to represent the
rights of many individual users, he might correctly determine that "we are in
the business of protecting water rights and our share holders are our
customers." The mutual irrigation company is a user-cooperative-an exclusive group of water users who share in the cost of diverting and conveying,
and who strictly adhere to the tenant that each share holder is entitled to a
part of the hydrologic cycle to the exclusion of all others. Holding fast to this
tenant has perhaps misdirected the efforts of the organizations. The mutual
irrigation company is not an efficient producer or conveyor of water, it is not
well managed and it is not really effective as a social organ to get the best use
from a scarce resource. The farmer does not need an organization to "protect
his water right." In fact, he does not need a water right. What he really needs
is water! And an organization committed to this task, delivering water, would
render a far greater service to society and to the farmer than the user-coop he
tenaciously hangs on to.
How would a quasi-governmental agency like an irrigation district
answer the question, "what is our business, and who are our customers?" The
district is tax supported, is enclosed in boundaries set by law, is limited by
law to a single-purpose water use, and measures its performance by its ability
to keep expenditures within its taxable revenue-or perhaps that should be
stated in reverse-to keep taxable revenue equal to expenditure. It appears
doubtful that it has ever been asked the question about its purpose other than
to build a distribution system, and its customers become vaguely discernible.
In a market situation it is the customer who decides if the seller is pushing the
right product or giving the right service. The consumer, by exercising choice,
is the controlling agent. Not so in a government service organization. The
consumer is forced to pay the bill, but he has little to say about the product
or the service. The government service organization then, tends to become an
end in itself and not the means to an end. It may operate efficiently but it is
not an effective social organ.
Similarly, the mUnicipal water department has not correctly assessed its
role or purpose of existence. Its answer to the question would probably be,
"we are in the business of treating and delivering water." And the question
about who its customers are may receive a vague answer like "the city." But
who is the city? Some may say the customers are the householders,
apartment owners, businesses, and industries that pay a monthly waterbill,
but that is not correct because these people do not control the business; not
in the same sense anyway that the customer controls the business of the retail
merchant. A business soon goes out of business if it cannot satisfy the needs
of its customers. In some sense the "voters" control the company because
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they have some voice in the providing of capital through the sale of bonds,
and they have voice in the selection of the public official who hires the head
of the water department. Are the "voters" then the customers? Or are the
customers those who complain until a problem is corrected? Is the water
department misdirecting its efforts? Consider that it evaluates its performance
on negative values, such as satisfying the complaints of citizens; or on the
engineering statistics like per capita consumption rates of increase or
decrease, or costs of production in dollars per acre foot, or number of
connections in service, or total amount of water delivered.
The problem of defining the purpose of governmental service organizations worsens as the level of government and degree of bureaucracy increases.
Thus agencies like the Bureau of Reclamation, the Soil Conservation Service,
the Forest Service, and the Corps of Engineers fmd it impossible to even ask
the question "what is our business (purpose) and what should it be" let alone
attempt to answer it. These organizations are not means to accomplish ends,
but are ends in themselves. They hold vested interests in the federal budget
which they use to enhance the organization and accrue benefits to their own
employees. The nearest one could come to defining their purpose is
"survival," which is an inadequate social goal for any organization. Members
within the organization are quick to quote the federal laws which give them
authority to function but these laws do not define the purpose or "business"
of the organization.
Equally ineffective and without purpose is the partnership which links
the federal bureaucracy, the Bureau of Reclamation in most cases, with the
state bureaucracy, the Water Conservancy Districts. Operating by itself, a
district compares with a large municipal water department-operating with a
certain amount of efficiency but not fully performing because of its
dependence upon tax revenue and police force. When coupled with the
federal agency the district loses all sense of purpose, and tends to make wrong
decisions. The district becomes the repayment collector for the Bureau of
Reclamation and the chief lobbiest in Congress for project appropriations.
Water distribution, the movement of water from a place of origin to a
place of use, is a marketable service requiring management, labor, and capital.
Water distribution is therefore a business opportunity which can fulfill a
social need. There is no need or justification for using government service
organizations to perform this function. Not being able to derme their purpose
or to concentrate their efforts on the right tasks makes government service
agencies unperforming social organs.
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PART II
WATER INSTITUTIONS
MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANIES
Historically, the most prominent and certainly the most numerous,
water institution in Utah has been the private association of water users
commonly known as the Mutual Irrigation Company. The word mutual is a
descriptive term to indicate the manner in which the company functions but
is not included in any of the official names of the separate irrigation
companies. The companies are "mutual" because they are owned by and
operated for the benefit of the members, but they do not resemble traditional
"mutual" companies such as insurance companies or savings banks which
operate without capital stock, or stockholders. The irrigation company in
Utah is actually a unique hybrid organization resembling traditional mutual
forms in action, but clinging to vestiges of a "business" under which law it
was originally formed. The irrigation company is a stock company which does
not operate a "business" and a mutual company which is owned by
stockholders. Having a resemblance in some respects to both types of
organizations, in actual operation the irrigation company is like neither of
them. The common element in both a stock company and a mutual company
is that both operate a business for profit. The differences between the two
forms are in the manner in which the business profits are distributed and the
way in which leadership is acquired. In a stock company the profits which are
not retained to build the business are distributed to the stockholders as
dividends. Leadership is acquired through vote of the membership (stockholders). In a mutual company the profits result in an adjustment in the price
of the product or services to the membership. Thus an insurance premium
may be lowered, the interest earned on savings increased, or the price received
for agricultural products increased. Leadership in a mutual form is generally
by a self-perpetuating committee or board and not by voting of the
membership. In a stock company the business is operated for the benefit of
the stockholders, but no stockholder is required to participate in the
operation or production aspects of the business. No stockholder is involved in
decisions of management and generally has no interest in what management
does as long as the profit-loss statement indicates that right decisions are
being made. His liability is limited to the amount of stock he owns and he can
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unemotionally detach himself from the company if share values begin to
drop.
A mutual company is not only operated for the benefit of the members
but also by the members. Thus each member contributes to the product of
the company such as money for reinvestment or to amortize loss, or farm
products to be marketed. Management efficiency is assured through freedom
to withdraw membership and join with competitors. In some cases the
membership may be liable for losses incurred by the business.
The irrigation company differs from these two forms in one important
aspect. The irrigation company does not make a profit. In other words, the
irrigation company does not operate a business. It was initially allowed to
incorporate under the business laws of the state with some vague understanding that the water received as a shareholder was a "dividend" on the
stock. This is an erroneous concept because dividends are immediately linked
with profits and the generation of new wealth through the use of capital
investments. Water, being a product of nature and not of man, is not
considered capital and is much like electricity, of no value until used and even
then it does not become a substantial part of the finished product. Therefore,
water as a dividend on a capital investment shortchanges the investor
considerably.
Another difficult concept to understand concerning irrigation companies is the reason for issuing shares of stock which represent capital
investments in a non-business. What capital does an irrigation company
actually own? As a rule, irrigation companies do not own real estate,
equipment, buildings, machinery, or any of the normally considered capital
or wealth producing items. The only thing the irrigation company owns
which has any semblance to capital, and which even then, is intangible and
has substance only in law and custom, is a water right. It is doubtful if this
water right can be considered capital because of itself it does not produce
wealth. The irrigation companies could have organized without capital and
resembled more the mutual companies they operate like.
The irrigation company can thus be described as a non-business,
operating without capital by its members for the mutual protection of their
water rights. Being without capital it cannot build or even rebuild extensive
water distribution systems, being a non-profit-non-loss organization it can
only incur costs, and being operated by the membership it can only share
costs and management decisions. Having a water right as its only valuable
asset, its major function must be to protect that right against all encroachment. All other activities such as cleaning and maintenance of the ditches,
headgates, etc., and the allocation of water to the shareholders are secondary
to this major task.
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The protective nature of the irrigation company was its primary
attraction at its inception. The physical systems had already been built and
therefore venture capital was not needed. The water law was undergoing
change and courts were beginning to adjudicate water claims. To consolidate
the users under one ditch or diversion into an enduring entity to protect and
preserve the system was the motivating force behind the incorporation of
water users into irrigation companies.
The organizational structure was designed to resist change and to this
end it has been most effective. In fact, many companies today are rmding it
difficult to adapt to land use changes caused by urbanization and industrialization. But the more serious problems caused by this rigidity is the waste of
the total resource caused by multiple inefficient systems which refuse to be
consolidated and improved. For over 30 years this problem has been observed
and exposed by competent researchers, but no change has been forthcoming.
The writer would like to emphasize at this point, that the solution to
this problem of inefficient water use and failure to consolidate irrigation
systems lies in the organization structures and not in the people who make up
the membership of irrigation companies. As with any organization the people
are bound and directed by the organization. It is true people staff the
organization, but the organization directs. Thus an irrigation company directs
toward water rights protection and away from change and management for
efficient water use. The older generation can pass away assured that those
who follow will still protect, still resist change, aI1d still unmanage. Not until
an organizational change is effected, will the effort be redirected into other
paths.
With the present resemblance to a business organization the irrigation
company could most easily redirect its efforts by actually becoming a
"business." This would require a simple change in the articles of incorporation to permit the company to make a profit and contract with its
shareholders to assure delivery of water when needed at a price. To make a
profit the company management would need to be autonomous and have
freedom to operate in a market environment and to develop a clear
understanding of who its customers are and what its business should be.
Instead of protecting a water right the company would be in the business of
providing a needed service and at the same time efficiently utilizing a valuable
natural resource.

GOVERNMENTAL WATER SERVICE AGENCIES
Perhaps the oldest water service organization of a governmental nature
is the municipal water department. Some of the oldest water systems in
America go back to the early 1800's when pipes were made from hollowed
out logs. The need in those days was not so much for drinking water for the
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inhabitants but for fire protection. Since fire protection is definitely a social
responsibility and not an area for business entrepreneurship and competition,
it was natural for local governments to provide this kind of protective service.
The other municipal uses of water naturally followed and local government
has become by tradition the most likely organization to provide water service
within a community. These organizations do not have an exclusive right to
this service, however, because in some areas privately owned water utilities
.have successfully assumed this responsibility. In Utah, the first attempt to
provide municipal water service was done through a separately chartered
corporation created by the territorial legislature known as the "Great Salt
Lake Water Works Association." It came after the chartering of Salt Lake
City and was not a part of the city government but the city was allowed to
subscribe for capital stock not to exceed $100,000. The function of the
company was later assimilated into the city government. A more recent
provision in the law has also permitted quasi governmental units to be
organized most often with taxing authority, as a special single purpose water
district. Often this type of governmental agency supplies water needs in the
unincorporated areas outside of municipal boundaries. In Utah these special
improvement districts are a creation of county government and are in turn
accountable to the County Commission. Much of what will be said about
municipal water departments is also true of special water districts.
Municipal water departments are not always efficient and in many ways
are not effective organizations. Being a product of governmental expansion
the organization structure is determined by elected officials who in most
cases have no managerial training and no insight into the type of structure
needed for effective service to the community. The manager or department
head works in this predetermined structure without full autonomy, without a
vision of what the social purpose of the organization is, and under the stress
of satisfying his bosses in city hall. The workers within the organization
reflect this lack of purpose and unity of direction and are generally
uninspired, less than productive, and underachieving. The organization lacks
entrepreneurial leadership and is content to do things in the same way year
after year. Like all government service agencies it clings to the past and
generates few new innovative ideas.
Some of the problems of governmental domestic water service agencies
are associated with the size of the system and the resources of the agency.
Throughout Utah today there are numerous small domestic municipal water
systems with number of customers ranging from 20 to 500. These systems are
too small to employ a full time professional manager and are thus run by a
member of the elected council and perhaps a hired worker with some pipe
fitting skill. This lack of management skill however, is less serious at this level
than it is at the deciSion-making level within the town council. When this
council lacks persons trained in hydraulics and hydrologic principles, wrong
decisions are often made with regard to size and location of reservoirs,
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pipelines, and distribution networks. For this reason the council often hires
engineering consultants to assist them in obtaining an adequately designed
system. Consultants are hired to design workable systems which will satisfy
all the requirements of the various regulatory agencies established by
government. Sanitary and environmental requirements must be met along
with restraints imposed by granting or lending agencies. The consultant is
familiar with all these requirements and thus designs systems which qualify.
He is therefore a non-innovator, clinging to the past and shying away from
practices which may attract the attention and questioning of the regulatory
bodies. He designs systems which he knows will pass regulations and stands a
fair chance of being built. After all, his fee is based on a constructed project.
In doing so, though, he contributes to technological obsolescence and
preservation of the past.
The small town also lacks the capital resource necessary for adequate
water distribution systems. Uke other utilities a water system is highly capital
intensive. Most small towns lack a tax base which is large enough for capital
financing of water distribution systems. Money must therefore be borrowed
using the general tax obligations or the expected revenues as collateral for the
lending agency. General obligation bonds require the approval of the citizens
and this is not always given. Grants or loans from the federal agencies are
therefore sought. These federal monies have much the same effect as direct
tax revenue, being a source of money which is not linked to the performance
of the spending organization. The spending of federal funds on domestic
water systems by municipal water departments, regardless of the size of water
system, is further removed from the conscience and an obligation to perform
than is bonded revenue. Thus, there is even less of an incentive to perform.
The larger water departments have more money to work with, but their
problems with efficiency and effectiveness are not fewer. In fact beyond a
certain size the water departments become bogged down in bureaucracy and
become susceptible to many of the ills of big government. Water revenues are
usually more than sufficient to pay general expenses and investmentrepayment and since the surplus is turned over to the general fund of the
mUnicipality for use on non-water related functions, the incentives to
efficient use of labor and material are lacking. A searching attitude for new
and better ways of doing things is not present and the service to the customer
is not improved. Service to customers is replaced with an effort known as
"customer relations," which is concentrated on answering complaints and
placating complainers-coupled with a public relations program. Survival of
the organization is assured; but "empire building" is somewhat restricted
because of limitations on growth within set boundaries.
The influence of the method used to pay an organization in the
discharge of its purposes cannot be overemphasized. It has been stated earlier
that to pay for performance directs toward performance. Other words can be
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substituted for the word performance and the statement remains correct.
Thus to be paid out of a budget directs toward establishment of the budget
and to be paid out of tax revenue directs toward the collection of taxes. In
these latter two examples, performance is left out. The organization does not
need to perform; that is, it does not need to be efficient and it does not need
to satisfy social objectives. Such performance is not required when costs are
provided by a budget which is assured by the collection of a tax. Municipal
water departments are not paid to perform because their money comes from
tax revenue and tolls collected and budgeted by the municipality. If the
revenue from tolls collected from water users is not sufficient to meet
expenses, the deficit is made up from general tax revenue and future toll rates
increased. Surpluses from the collection of tolls go back into the general fund
for allocation to the other city departments. A deficit or a "loss" is not a
threat to survival of the department nor is it taken as an indicator that things
might be done wrongly or inefficiently. In a like manner a surplus or "profit"
is not an indicator that right decisions are being made as to the real social
value of the department. As long as the tax revenue is available as a "prop" to
support inefficiencies and as long as the water department represents an
uncontrolled government monopoly backed by the power of force and police
action, the organization will remain directed toward inefficiency, non-performance, and ineffectiveness.
Associated with the direction toward non-performance is the lack of
innovative entrepreneurial management. No risks are involved, therefore no
need to change is felt. In fact changes are openly resisted. Clinging to the past
is a lUXUry market controlled businesses are not permitted to enjoy-not for
long anyway, or they are forced out of business. The water department has
reinforcement to its own built in resistance to change from the regulatory
laws and agencies, including trade associations, which codify practices into a
rigid, unbending system. Even new technolOgical changes including new
materials and devices developed by service industries find slow acceptance by
these organizations.
The trade associations, particularly the American Water Works Association, has admitted in recent publications that domestic water service to users
could be improved. Their answer to the problem is to better educate the
operators and individual workers in the water departments. This writer
contends that the problem is not with the persons employed but in the
organizational systems.
One other aspect of mUnicipal water departments is also linked to the
way income is collected and dispersed. Because the "profit" or surplus after
expenses is turned over to the general tax fund, no allocation for research is
ever made. In general the research for water department problems is done by
universities, state health departments, industrial suppliers, federal laboratories, and private water utilities. Trade journals usually represent the link to
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communicate the research information to the department user. A large part
of the research information is never implemented and much of the research
effort is misdirected into areas which may not be directly related to real
world problems. An example of a research system which has been effective in
contributing to social betterment while also improving business is the
telephone company's Bell Laboratories. Supported by profits from the
telephone business, the laboratory was asked to research methods of
improving telephone service. When a discovery was made the implementation
link was direct and not through a convention speech or an article in a trade
journal with the hope someone might listen or read and be converted. Jhls
extremely effective type of research has not found place in the water service
industry because there are no direct profits to support research, and no means
of implementing discoveries that might be valuable. The remote researcher
has difficulty in directing his research toward the right problems.
WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICTS
Municipal water departments may have problems of inefficiency and
ineffectiveness as a result of their organizational defects, but despite this they
have accomplished many things and have made some contributions toward
social betterment. The situation could be improved by introducing risk and
profit into the management scheme, but even without this they far out
perform the latest creation of government in the water industry, the water
conservancy district.
The water conservancy act was originally passed in Utah in 1941, but
the concepts embodied in the act would not have been tolerated by the Utah
public a decade earlier. Even the Wright Irrigation District law, which found
acceptance in California in 1896, was never fully transferred to Utah because
of some of the ideologic tenets promoted in the law. The idea of taxing all
the people to pay for projects which directly benefit only a few and to pay
for projects which many felt should be the responsibility of private enterprise
was resisted by the Utah people until the federal government overturned these
concepts with its promotion of the welfare state during the 1930's.
As was stated in an earlier publication, the water conservancy ideology
was a creation of the Federal Bureau of Reclamation. Like all federal
bureaucracies the original "ends" or purposes of the bureau were soon
forgotten and the "organization" became the "end." Survival became the
most important purpose of the organization and real social values became lost
in the struggle. Survival of the Bureau of Reclamation was dependent upon its
continuancy in the work of building the nation's dams and developing entire
river systems whether such development was needed or not. Complete river
development requires lots of money and it was obvious that the farmer users
of the water could never be made guarantors of such high repayments as
would be necessary. Hence, the Bureau pushed for the creation of a new
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vehicle-a state governmental subdivision with broad powers of taxation-no
limitation on how the taxes would be spent as long as it was water oriented,
and almost complete immunity from pressures and directions from the
taxpayer. The organization would not have to meet either the market test of
profitability, or the political test of a free election. There would be no one to
question whether the decisions made were right and no signals to the
organization which would indicate whether it was doing the right things.
There would be no need t6 innovate, no need to change or to cast off the
obsolete, and no need to perform. Such an organization would tend to and
does make wrong decisions.
I

The writer has learned through conversations with taxpayers in various
parts of the state that most of the citizens of the state are completely
ignorant and uninformed as to what the Conservancy Act says or as to what
conservancy districts are doing or have the power to do. They may hear
through the public media that the governor supports the district and hear
certain of the bureaucratic leaders under the governor reiterate this support,
or they may read some of the "public relations" material put out by the
district; but few actually know what the district really is or how it is spending
public money. This is probably what the writers of the original bill intended
when they attempted to "take politics out of water development." What they
really intended was to remove the spotlight of public attention and make it
difficult if not impossible for the public, the tax paying public, to interfere
with the project. The writer did fmd some informed citizens in the upper
moUntain valleys of the Weber River, but they chased him from their
property thinking he represented the "Weber Project."
Because of this general lack of knowledge about conservancy districts
the writer feels it is important to discuss certain aspects of their organization
and operation particularly as it pertains to the efficient and effective
utilization of the water resource. If the conservancy district concept is a
restraint to effective use then its abolishment or restructuring must be part of
the alternatives considered in this report.
A first reading of the Conservancy Act gives one the impression that an
organization could be created that would meet social needs by managing the
water supply and building the needed distribution systems. The language
sounds good, but when one stops to consider that governmental oriented
organizations have a notorious reputation for not performing why should this
particular act behave differently? As Drucker (1974) has said, "to turn any
area over to 'government creates conflict-creates vested and selfIsh interests,
and complicates decisions ... to tum something over to government makes it
political instead of abolishing politics." He further stated:
... We are very good at creating administrative agencies. But no sooner are
they called into being than they become ends in themselves, acquiring a
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"vested right" to grants from the treasury and to continuing support from
the taxpayer, and achieve immunity to political direction. No sooner, in
other words, are they born than they defy public will and public policy.

These words are probably true at all levels of government but probably
more true at the federal than at local levels particularly if the local taxpayers
have recourse to a free election mechanism to effect changes. The
Conservancy Act provides for a political subdivision of the state which should
make it local in nature and responsiveness to the local taxpayers. This
responsiveness and "local government" flavor has been averted in two ways.
First, the leadership of the organization is not elected by taxpayers. Instead
the leadership, the board of directors, is approved by the judge of the judicial
district in which the conservancy district is formed. This means that despite
the fact that the Conservancy District Act was a creation of the legislature,
the organization and the development of the water resource becomes a
judicial function and not a legislative perogative. The fact that the taxpayers
elect the district judge somehow meets the "due process" clause of the
Constitution, but under the same theory why don't the judges also appoint
the mayors of cities and commissioners of counties?
Whenever a vacancy occurs in the board of directors of the conservancy
district a new appointment is made by the judge after receiving a
recommendation from the remaining board members. Thus the board
becomes self-perpetuating and completely unresponsive to the taxpayers in
the district. A self· perpetuating board of directors may be permissible in a
business such as a mutual savings bank or a mutual insurance company, where
the business is regulated by the market, but without that market force and in
a government capacity the practice is intolerable.
The second factor, which destroys the local government flavor of the
district, is the strong contractual ties the district makes with the federal
government. This, of course, was the intent of the act in the first place-to
link the federal government with a state government unit so that "local"
pressure could be demonstrated in support of federal projects and so that
repayment of the project could be guaranteed-with the backing of the police
power of the state if necessary. The Act provides for the contractual
arrangements with the federal government but does not make such contracts
mandatory. A district could exist without such contracts but none of the
districts in Utah are known to exist without this link today. The Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District originally started out without this federal
link and made considerable progress developing a good quality underground
water supply. What inducements caused it to change its direction is not
known by the writer, but it began its link to the federal system by
contracting with the Salt Lake Metropolitan Water District which has a
repayment contract with the federal Deer Creek Project. The link was made
complete when the Central Utah Water Conservancy District was formed and
a repayment contract promised obligating the SLCWCD to use Central Utah
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Project water. Since that time the SLCWCD has ceased to develop or fully
utilize underground water and buys higher priced treated river water from
Central Utah, via the Salt Lake Metropolitan Water District. The economic
soundness of this practice is questionable.
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District presently has 13 fully
equipped and operable deep wells. The water from these wells is of good
quality and does not need to be treated except for contingent disinfection. In
addition the district has water rights in several springs which also deliver
water not needing treatment. The wells have already been drilled and
equipped and tied into the distribution system so when costs are compared
with water purchased from Central Utah capital amortization need not be
considered. Also, since the cost of the water rights in the springs has also been
paid for, that water is essentially free-not being purchased annually nor
involving annual energy costs to put it into the system. Using the figures
reported in the 1970 annual report of the Salt Lake County Water
('onservancy District and the accountant's report for the same period the
following can be deduced:
The district bought, acquired, or pumped 14,055 acre feet of water
from the following sources:
Acre Feet
(' ost
From I J wells operating 15';{, of capacity
From springs
Purchascd from Metropolitan Water District
Other (exchanges)

4,252
1,808
7.988

$ 54.313
253.858

7

$308.171
14.055
Without the contract with the Metropolitan District, Salt Lake Cou,nty
W(,D could have supplied the total demand from the existing wells and still
had reserve capacity as follows:
Acre Feet
('ost
From 13 wells operating 45<';, of capacity
F rOI1l sp rings
Other cxdlangcs

12.230
1.808
7

$146.760

14.055

$146.760

A savings of $161 ,411.
The savings would actually be greater than this since the power rate
would decrease when operating over a longer period of time. Assuming the
power rate reduced to $8.00 per acre foot average instead of the $12.00 used
in the calculations, the savings would approximate the total revenue collected
from the one mill advalorem tax. $216.000, making taxation unnecessary to
the tlnanciaI success of the district.
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Whenever one reads the PR literature put out by the conservancy
districts one expects that the next time he turns on his tap there will be no
water. The nagging fear of a water shortage is constantly imaged before the
reader. The district must use fear tactics in order to maintain its control over
the public purse. If the truth were exposed, the economic blunders of the
bureaucratic system might create enough citizen reaction to put the
conservancy districts out of action, but as long as fear is created and apathy is
present this system is secure.
Consider again the Salt Lake County WCD. The 1970 demand on its
system was 14,000 acre feet of water. The 13 existing wells have a combined
capacity of 32,000 acre feet per year. Adding the present spring flow to this
gives the district a present capacity of 34,000 acre feet per year. In addition
the district has pending applications on ftle with the State Engineer for 20
new wells with a combined capacity of 170 cubic feet per second or about
124,000 acre feet per year. A recent groundwater study by the U.S. Geologic
Survey (Hedy et al., 1971) estimates the annual usable recharge to the
groundwater basin in Salt Lake County to exceed 100,000 acre feet per year.
Therefore, the district could meet a water demand over seven times its 1970
demand without any importations and treatment of out of basin water.
Furthermore, the groundwater supply is less likely to fluctuate than surface
supply and is therefore a more reliable source. The 20 new wells could be
drilled and equipped for a cost well under $2,000,000. Now consider the
alternate chosen by the district: Imported water must be treated and to do
this, a $9,000,000 treatment plant plus a $6,000,000 investment in a terminal
reservoir and aqueduct has been built with a total capacity without furthet
capital investment of 40,000 acre feet per yeat. Just slightly over the present
capacity of the 13 well system which was built for under $500,000. The
treatment plant is dependent upon the completion of the Bonneville unit of
the Central Utah Project, however, and the cost of thls uni~ willyrobably
exceed $500,000,000 before completion. Salt Lake County's totiIT commitment from this source is 50,000 acre feet which represents an annual cost of
$3,500,000. That's a tremendous cost to bring treated water into an area that
already has an excellent usable supply.
Why doesn't tl;1e Salt Lake County WCD develop more of its
groundwater? The answer is locked into the type of contract it has
encumbered itself within its purchase agreement with the Metropolitan
Water District. The accountant's report (Haynie et aI., 1971) for 1970 gives
the following:
Contract agreements relating to the future purchase of water provide
that the District will not buy elsewhere until it has bought at least 3,000
acre feet per year from Metropolitan at an agreed price of $40 per acre
foot and that additional water (over the 3,000 acre feet already
contracted) will be purchased from Metropolitan, or in any event, pay for
water in quantities not less than those shown in the following tabulation at
a minimum price of $40 per acre foot:
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Calendar
Year

Acre Feet of
Water Per Year
(Additional)

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

2,040
2,290
2,540
2,740
2,940
3,140
3,330
3,520
3,710
3,900

Commencing with the calendar year 1980, the Conservancy District
will buy from the Metropolitan District, or in any event, pay for sufficient
water above the 3,000 acre feet and in excess of that provided for as set
forth in the foregoing tabulation, so or to the extent that at least one-half
of all the water distributed by the Conservancy District shall be water
which has been acquired from Metropolitan. During the calendar year
1980, and all years thereafter, the Conservancy District will buy at least
one-half of all its total domestic water requirements from the Metropolitan
District until the Conservancy District is buying from Metropolitan District
a total of 10,000 acre feet per annum. The minimum rate for water sold
under the agreements shall be $40 per acre foot, but this rate may be
increased in future years based on increased operating, maintenance and
administrative costs of Metropolitan District works.
The District also has a supplemental agreement with Metropolitan for
the purchase of additional water. Under this agreement, the District will
purchase its regular annual quantity of water as outlined above plus an
additional five per cent (5%) of that amount each year at the contract price
of $40 per acre foot. The District may then purchase additional water to
the extent it is available at $20 per acre foot.

There are several parts of this contract that need to be emphasized.
First, the contract prevents the purchase of water from any other source until
the agreed upon amounts have been satisfied. This is a restraint of free trade
that would not be tolerated except in a governmental monopoly and forces
the district into higher prices. The same tactic is used, however, by the
district when it sells water to its wholesale customers. These contracts prevent
the customer from purchasing water from any other source and also dictate
to the customer when and how much water he can use from his own
previously developed wells. There are no alternatives offered or open to the
customer. Private controlled monopolies have never been able to exercise this
kind of dictatorial power.
Another part of this contract makes payment mandatory whether the
water is used or not. Instead of a sales contract it is actually a repayment
contract obligating the district to guarantee repayment of a portion of the
project cost. In case of default the federal government has first lien on the
taxing authority of the district which by law can be extended beyond the one
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mill limit to whatever amount is needed to meet the obligation. This then
reverts back to the individual property owner who is forced to pay the tax
imposed or have his property confiscated and sold. This points to another
disadvantage in governmental agencies. They operate by law which by nature
is a forcible procedure. Al1laws can be enforced and are backed by the police
power of the state. Again the repayment nature of this sales contract between
the district and the federal government (via the Metro District) is repeated
when the district makes contracts with its customers-the bill must be paid
whether the water is used or not. Contrasting this with a private monopoly
operating in the utility business, a customer still has some choice. Water is an
important part of life but it isn't necessary that water be imported and
delivered to one's home to survive. Disregarding the convenience of piped
water, a person can choose to dig his own well, build a cistern, or haul water
from a distant stream. The point is, if he chooses not to use the monopoly's
distriBution system, he doesn't have to pay for it. In the government's
monopoly operating under force oflaw, that choice is not available.
Another part of the contract which limits the district to high prices is
the requirement to buy at least one-half of all its water from the Metro Water
District until the limit of 10,000 acre feet per year is reached. This limits the
amount of well water that can be used. In 1970, the district bought 54
percent of its water requirement from Metro. They were required to buy at
least 7027 acre feet which limited their well production to 5210 acre feet
(960 acre feet more than they actually pumped). By contract then, the
district is prevented from using its cheaper underground source. In explaining
this to the public however, Mr. Hilbert, the district general manager,
explained in an article submitted to Western City Magazine,March 26,1971:
The District has applications on file with the State Engineer's Office for
development of a total of 125 cts. from groundwater sources. Of this
amount, 40 cts. has actually been developed and is used in current
operations. At the present time, the wells are used only during the peak
demand summer months. We regard this supply as a reserve to provide
needed water during dry periods when surface and imported supplies may
be limited.

What Mr. Hilbert didn't say was that the district was prevented by
contract from using underground water and that the "reserve" is not a bank
account to be drawn upon in times of shortage but is an annual flow which is
part of the hydrologic cycle in Salt Lake County and which if the district
does not use is discharged into Great Salt Lake and evaporated without use.
The other feature of the contract which should be mentioned is the
price specified for water used or contracted for. The present price of 40
dollars per acre foot is an arbitrary figure designed to repay the project
construction cost and is geared to the customers' ability to pay and not to the
marginal value of the water. As is noted this $40 is a minimum and subject to
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increase when the federal agencies decide its time to change. Because the
Central Utah Project is costing so much more per unit of water produced than
the Deer Creek Project it is likely water or repayment for that project will be
much higher than $40. The SLCWCD is obligating itself to repay 50,000 acre
feet worth of project costs. When these new contracts come out they will
probably reflect this higher cost and will contain other restrictive clauses
which will further prevent the district from utilization of underground water.
The things mentioned with regard to the Salt Lake County Water
Conservancy District are typical and apply to all water conservancy districts
in Utah. The Weber Basin WCD has many of the same restricting features in
its contract with users plus an additional set of restrictions which pertain to
agricultural users. One of the most prominent features about agricultural
water is the low price, less than $3.00 per acre foot, which represents the
subSidy being paid by the domestic users. Here again the price is arbitrary,
based upon what someone has judged to be the ability of the user to pay. The
user does not make this choice. The agricultural user is also told how much
water he needs and where he can use the water. Like all other users, the
farmer does not actually buy water, but obligates himself to repay part of the
project and consents to have the county tax collector assess and collect his
repayment fee along with his other property taxes. He thus becomes subject
to a tax lien and loss of his farm if he becomes delinquent.
The Weber Project is also a good example of the tendency governmental
service agencies have to make wrong decisions. The Bureau of Reclamation
was originally invited to Davis County to assist in a small storage project to
provide additional irrigation water for some of the dry bench land. The
Bureau used the opportunity to inveigle support for the entire Weber River
Basin development. Without reviewing all the history, suffice it to say that as
a result, the Bureau designed dams for every conceivable site, caused the
formation of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, and built a project
that far exceeds the demands for water in the basin and again, completely
ignored the underground supply. To guarantee repayment of the $90,000,000
project the emphasis has had to be placed on domestic use of water.
Sub-conservancy districts, special improvement districts, and two-pipe distribution systems have had to be promoted in order to find enough repayment
guarantors to keep the project alive. As a result Davis and Weber counties
now have the highest domestic water rates in the state, local agriculture has
not increased and the District still has water it can't find a buyer for.
Overinvestment in unneeded facilities is typical of federal governmental
service agencies. What has been true in Weber will also be true in the gigantic
Central Utah Project. The public investment in this project will probably
approximate one billion dollars before all facilities are completed and many
are not and will not be needed.
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PART III

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations suggested here will probably never be implemented. The writer feels however that he must suggest them knowing that
many will differ and argue in defense of the status quo. Eventually, though,
change must come, and if society is to be improved those changes must
incorporate some of the principles enumerated in this report; namely,
freedom to make individual choices, protection by government from those
who would destroy, and the opportunity to use individual resources to
achieve or fail. These are in essence the things that make this country great
and were known in the beginning as self-evident truths. This report is a
defense of the American way and an attack against paternal government and
socialism. Though primarily directed at water service organizations the
principles are not confined to this resource.
The primary conclusions of this study are:
1. The efficiency and effectiveness associated with any social task is
highly dependent upon the organization formed to accomplish that task. The
reasons or the laws of organization which explain why one organization is
more effective than another are not fully understood and delineated at this
time. A pragmatic approach to the problem does suggest, however, some
facets that appear to be true. It can be observed, for example, that:
(a) Organizations create power. This power can be used to
invent, manufacture, and distribute to society the products which improve
life styles and raise so called "standards of living." The variety of foods and
food packaging, clothes, building materials and transportation and communication equipment available today is evidence of this power. This type of
organization or group of organizations is known collectively as "business."
The power of organizations can also be used to coerce and demand
concessions from those organizations which produce by controlling the
workers and causing work stoppage and strikes. The labor union demonstrates
this use or misuse of the power of organization. A third example of the power
of organization is the governmental agency which uses law and force to
accomplish what supposedly are legitimate social tasks. This last examplifies
the least creative and most wasteful use of the power of organization. It
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should not be hard to observe that the most creative and least wasteful use of
organizational power is found in "business."
(b) It can also be observed that the power of organization can be
misused or abused. Business has at times exploited the worker, unions have
engaged in criminal activities and often made demands which have a negative
impact on society, and governments have become despotic and dictatorial
having little regard for human life. The tendency is for people who seek and
obtain great power to abuse that trust in selfish pursuits. This is a trait of
human nature which must be coped with in any organization.
(c) A final observation which can be made is that the efficiency
and effectiveness of an organization is linked to the method by which the
organization receives its income. In a free society, the business organization
must please its customers to remain in business. This calls for creativity,
innovation, and entrepreneurial leadership. Abuses, when they occur, are
most often linked with the reinvestment of excess profits and the temptation
to buy special privileges or to influence legislation. A labor union on the
other hand has no customers to please and little accountability for the use of
funds extracted from its members. The "dues" paid by the members do not
buy performance from the union leaders. Governments use the force of law
to collect the revenue it needs and parcels it out to departments on a budget
basis. Performance, again, is not purchased by the tax. The following truism
can be stated as pertaining to the method of payment to an organization.
"Paying for performance, directs toward performance-paying for a budget
directs toward collecting the budget."
2. The water organizations in the State of Utah are non-businesses;
most are governmental in nature, receiving revenues from taxes and
expending their funds from a budget allocated out of such revenue. These
organizations are, following the pattern of similar organizations, non-creative,
non-innovative and in many cases are inefficient and ineffective in meeting
optimum social needs.
3. The most desirable organizational form to satisfy social needs, as
proven and demonstrated through past experiences, is "business." It is not
sufficient to be "business like," but to be truly a business in which revenue is .
"earned" through the performance and service rendered. Free choice must be
maintained and protected by government, but government should not
attempt to operate or control. The motto for such organization should be,
"let every social need become a business opportunity."
If a business organization is the best form to manage water develop·
ment in the State of Utah, then the following steps are recommended to
allow movement in that direction.
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1. Amend the Utah Constitution by repealing Section 6 Article XI to
allow municipalities the same option as other water users, to dispose of
through sale or lease its water rights and associated physical works. This does
not release a municipality from the responsibility to protect its citizens from
fire danger or to provide its citizens with drinking water. It does allow the
city the opportunity to get out of a water distribution business and to turn
this over to a bona fide business which can operate without boundary
limitations and which can effect economies of scale by consolidating with and
interconnecting with other water systems. Typical case studies of problems in
this area are included as an appendix to this report.
2. Repeal the Water Conservancy District Act, Chapter 9 Section 73
Utah Code Annotated 1953. This the writer knows is probably like asking
someone to reverse the flow of the Colorado River, and when he suggests this
to colleagues they just smile knowingly and turn the conversation to other
subjects. But, the suggestion is not without merit. The alliance that exists
between the water conservancy districts and the Bureau of Reclamation is
diverting public resources into expensive and unnecessary projects and leading
to complete domination and control of water resources by the federal
government. Utah used to fight for state control of water resources, but since
the formation of the Central Utah Water Conservancy District, particularly,
the fervor has lessened. Federal control and domination in a resource area like
water which could be made a business opportunity is not good for Utah.
3. Have state assume debt to federal government. If the water
conservancy districts should be disincorporated some method of dispOSing of
the repayment con tracts with the federal government would have to be devised.
If the Utah congressional delegation could effect an agreement with the
federal government an arrangement might be made as follows: The State of
Utah would assume the present repayment obligation of an Bureau of
Reclamation projects in the state. Since this amounts to about $2,660,000
exclusive of Central Utah (USBR, 1965), and since the total assessed
valuation of all property in Utah (1973) is $2,145,248,000 an advalorem tax
of 1.2 mills would suffice. The Central Utah Project when complete would
add another 0.8 mill so that a total assessment of 2 mills for the next 60 years
would liquidate the debt. The state should then insist that all titles to water
rights, physical properties, and rights of way be relinquished to the state. The
state in turn could then lease or sell these facilities to private business
enterprises to operate in a free market mode wherever the market existed.
Any new projects envisioned should be decided by the market test and not by
federal bureaucrats.
4. Reestablish the water "privilege" concept and eliminate water
"rights." In the early period of settlement in Utah water was controlled by
each county and users were granted "privileges" to put such water to use.
When the users need ceased so did his "privilege." No right was vested and he
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could not sell or trade his right to another. Perhaps this method placed a
heavy burden an the Probate Judge who parceled out the privileges but the
concept does have some merit. Allocation from one use to a higher ~se is
assured and the waste by an inefficient user is controlled. Water is not wealth
producing capital and should therefore be treated differently than other
resources including land. When a person owns land and desires not to utilize it
for his own purposes he may lease it to his neighbor. The owner still retains
responibility for the land and stil). pays taxes on his investment. With water,
though, the user may lease his right to another and make no further
investment in the right, not even taxes. An example of this is an irrigation
company in Weber County which, because of extensive subdividing has ceased
to provide irrigation water. It maintains its right, though, by leasing water to
the municipal water company. The irrigation company pays no maintenance
cost, does not pay taxes, and has absolutely no expense connected with the
water delivery system. The municipality pays all costs and the irrigation
company receives an annual "windfall" profit which it distributes to the share
holders. The irrigation company makes no contribution yet receives benefits.
The difference between this type of situation and an owner of land is that at
the termination of the lease of land the owner still has title to a marketable
substance. A water right on the other hand is dependent upon use. If the
municipality were to terminate its lease in this case, the irrigation company
would not be able to put the water to use either by itself or by lease to
another customer. This is a physical restriction because the land has been
subdivided and no other users or customers exist in that geographic setting.
The right would therefore be lost by non-use. In this case the proper thing
would be to let the title to the water "right" revert to the municipality. A
water "privilege" concept would do away with type of abuse.
5. Remove water utilities from control of the Public Service Commission. Private water utilities have not done well in Utah and one of the reasons
is the stringent control imposed by the Public Service Commission. Rate
control may be a way of life with the American consumer but arguments
against such control can be justified. Because certain types of businesses must
of necessity be operated as monopolies, fear of abuse has led consumers to
accept governmental control agencies. Many forget, however, that, particularly in the water business, governmental monopolies exist. Probably 90
percent of the domestic water systems in Utah are governmental monopolies
which do not come under the control of the Public Service Commission, and
hence are without rate regulation. Besides rate control, though, the Public
Service Commission practices a form of business restraint by limiting the
number of customers which a water utility can serve. It is this type of control
which must
removed if this important social need is to truly become a
business opportunity.

oe

6. Allow and encourage the formation of free market controlled water
utilities. The essence of all the previous recommendations is to prepare the
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way and make it possible for business to enter into the water distribution
field. The product is not water rights and not even water per se. The product
is and should be service! There may be many ways to structurally organize
such a business but the intent must be always the same, to give service to a
customer-to become society's organ for the discharge of the important social
task of managing water resources.
All organizations and institutions have power, and all of them exercise
power. All, therefore, need to take responsibility for their actions. An
organization is socially responsible when it satisfies society's needs through
concentration on its own specific job. An organization is most responsible
when it converts public needs into its own achievements. The organization
may be "private" but the people at the head are certainly "public."
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APPENDIX
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION FOR MUNICIPAL
WATER RIGHT TENURE IN UTAH
by
Trevor C. Hughes
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

Section 6 of Article XI of the Constitution of the State of Utah reads as
follows:
Sec. 6. (Municipalities forbidden to sell water-works or rights.)
No municipal corporation, shall directly or indirectly, lease, sell, alien
or dispose of any water-works, water rights, or sources of water supply
now or hereafter to be owned or controlled by it; but all such water works,
water-rights and sources of water supply now owned or hereafter to be
acquired by any municipal corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and
operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable
charges. Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to
prevent any such municipal corporation from exchanging water rights, or
sources of water supply, for other water-rights or sources of water supply
of equal value, and to be devoted in like manner to the public supply of its
inhabitants.

This appears to be a provision which is unique to the State of Utah. The
restriction applies to two very different items; water works and water rights.
The language would appear, in the first case, to prevent municipalities from
disposing of their physical facilities such as buried water pipelines, reservoirs,
etc. This unusual requirement, however, has not caused any difficulty because
it has apparently been largely ignored by the legal profession. Municipalities
continually abandon deteriorated pipelines and remove and replace worn
pumps and valves, etc. Because these items are normally replaced with equal
or better equipment no one seems worried about the fact that a rigid
interpretation of the Constitution would appear to prevent this sort of action.
This is perhaps not surprising in view of the obvious chaos which would result
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if cities were forced to maintain worn-out and obsolete equipment rather
than replace it. What is surprising is that Section 6 is enforced rather strictly
in regard to water rights and ignored in the case of water works; and this in
spite of the fact that some degree of flexibility is added in the last sentence
by the allowance for exchange of water rights of equal value but is silent in
regard to "exchange of water works."
Obviously Article 6 is in reality being interpreted to allow the exchange
concept in regard to water works regardless of the language and this long
established tradition essentially removes the potential danger. Even so, it
would appear that a constitutional amendment to clarify this matter would
be advisable. It is conceivable that a citizen or group, for example, which
opposed a municipal water system renovation could force a court test of this
provision on the basis that the new project included disposal of some existing
equipment. This could cause serious delay of the project and expense to the
city. This matter, however, as has been previously stated does not appear to
be causing recurring problems and will not be treated further. The more
serious impact of Article XI, Section 6, is in regard to water rights and the
balance of this section will be addressed to this problem.
It is easy to understand the intent of the framers of the Constitution in
regard to this section. In this arid climate a source of water, particularly one
which in its natural state was of a quality suitable for municipal use, was (and
is) an extremely valuable right. The possibility of short-sighted municipal
officials selling this valuable perpetual right during a period of excess water
availability in order to obtain capital to solve more immediate fiscal problems
was no doubt envisioned. The concept of preventing such action which could
result in a future municipal water shortage (or significant cost to treat an
alternative, lower quality source) is certainly a worthwhile goal. This was
undoubtedly the objective of the writers of Article XI, Section 6 of the Utah
Constitution.

In practice, however, the rigidity of the language of this section causes
numerous problems to municipal officials. In fact this rigidity can even have
the effect of defeating efforts to upgrade the quality of municipal water
supply rather than protecting it.
Most municipal officials are well aware of the value of a water right in
Utah. This is evidenced by the fact that most municipalities have long since
acquired rights (in the form of approved applications to appropriate) to the
available local high quality water such as spring flow and some groundwater.
Use of these sources is almost invariably much cheaper than treating other
poorer quality surface water. Acquiring an approved right to appropriate such
water is very easy. It requires merely
application with the State Division of
Water Rights. Since acquiring this "right to appropriate water" costs almost
nothing, such applications have been filed by even the smallest communities
in the state. The State Engineer has in general been lenient in approving

an
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applications for large amounts of municipal water for several reasons: 1) It is
difficult to assess the growth potential in municipal areas and city officials
typically have an optimistic opinion of the prospects for growth in their
community (evert in rural areas where the long term population trend has
been negative). 2) Even with a stable population, water demand is increasing
somewhat due to technology changes. 3) After the water source is developed
and put to use the State Engineer requires a "proof of appropriation" which
includes actual measurement of the flow being put to beneficial use. At this
time the water right can be decreased below the amount actually shown in
the application if the original amount was excessive.
This brings up the question of whether an approved application actually
constitutes a water right and is therefore subject to Article 6. In Utah, an
approved application to appropriate right is considered to be a valuable
inchoate right which may be defended in court. It is an unperfected right
which is "in process of being perfected." It appears to be well established that
an approved application does constitute a water right in the sense that a
municipality, because of Article 6, cannot dispose of it. The fact that the
quantity of flow approved in the application is subject to reduction as the
right changes from the inchoate to the perfected form is simply a
consequence of the state's appropriation procedure and is not subject to
control by the officers of a municipality, and therefore, as a practical matter
is not influenced by Article 6.
Many communities have approved applications for water rights greatly in
excess of their present needs. Their problem, however, is usually in financing
the development of their resource.
A large number of small communities in Utah constructtrl water supply
systems during the early 1930's by means of WPA projects. Unfortunately,
most of this effort was put into construction of distribution systems and the
water source was usually a local creek or canal. Typically the only treatment
was chlorination. Although some of the creeks produced reasonably good
quality water during the 1930's (during at least part of the year), few, if any
do now, and all of them experience serious contamination during storms.
Regardless of quality during particular periods of the year, hazards, such as
animal wastes in the creek channel above the diversion have caused the
Division of Health, as a matter of policy, to classify any such system as being
inadequate. Despite repeated warnings over many years by the Division of
Health, many community officials have been unable to finance the necessary
improvements in their systems.
With this background, let us consider the plight of a typical small
community in attempting to upgrade such a water system. The town may
have an approved application for water or may actually own water in a
quantity considerably in excess of its present needs. Frequently, other
potential users, both public and private, exist which create a sellers' market
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for high quality water. Many times these needs are small in terms of flow such
as for campgrounds, resorts, or ranches. Because the cost of alternative
sources of water may be very high, however, these other users may be willing
to pay a surprisingly large amount to purchase a part of the town's water.
This creates a potential source of financing a system which the town may be
unable to finance alone. The town could dispose of a small fraction of its
water right, still maintain a reasonable water reserve for future growth, and
solve its critical fiscal and public health problems. It cannot presently do this,
however, because of Article XI of the Constitution. Even a lease is considered
unconstitutional unless it is renewed on approximately an annual basis. The
potential outside user is not going to invest a substantial amount of capital in
the town's system with only a guaranteed one-year tenure on his water right.
It is the writer's opinion that this or very similar problems related to
Article XI have confronted many Utah communities since World War II; nor
are the problems associated with Article XI limited to small municipalities.
Virtually all large cities have a market for their treated water due to growing
demands in surrounding suburban areas. Frequently, due to economies of
scale, and to superior water rights, the urban center could wholesale excess
water to some of these other municipalities or water districts at a profit to
the urban center and a savings over alternate sources to the other users. They
can do so, however, only within a very restricted legal framework. On one
hand there is a state statute, U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-14, which provides:
They [cities) may construct, maintain and operate water-works ... or
authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of the same by
others, or purchase or lease such works from any person or corporation,
and they may sell and deliver the surplus product or service ... not
required by the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the
city.

Cities may not, however, purchase water solely for resale, nor construct,
own or manage facilities and equipment for distribution of water outside city
limits as general business (U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-14). This somewhat contradictory situation permits cities to sell "excess water" until it is needed by
the growing city but does not permit any sort of long-term contract which
provides security for the users outside the city (or security for th~ city in
recovering their capital investment in water distribution facilities). Because of
Article XI, Section 6, any such agreement is not constitutional, since it
effectively constitutes disposing of the water right. Many cities in Utah are in
fact selling their "excess" water to surrounding customers. A common means
of accomplishing this is for the two parties to sign very short-term
agreements.
Substantial capital investment in buried supply lines are then necessary
and are made with obvious belief that these short-term agreements will
continue to be renewed. If such investments are entirely based upon formal
short-term lease agreements, one wonders what informal "moral" agreements
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have been negotiated between various parties. Obviously the potential danger
of personality clashes threatening the continuity of such agreements as
political administrations change periodically presents a very real danger. The
opportunity for unethical political manuevering which these agreements
present because of vulnerability of the water purchaser is itself sufficient
reason to seek a change.
It is not the intent of the writer to suggest termination of such water
wholesaling but rather to completely legitimize it by allowing at least
long-term leases with their accompanying security.
\

One method which Salt Lake City has found to be useful in avoiding the
constitutional restriction was the creation of the Metropolitan Water District
of Salt Lake City (MWDSLC). A court case has established (Utah Code
Annotated, Vol. I A. p. 295) that the restriction "applies only to cities, towns
and villages and subdivisions of such cities, towns, and villages and does not
apply to water conservancy districts, which are not mUnicipalities within the
contemplation of that term as used in the constitution." The officers of the
MWDSLC are appointed by the elected officials of Salt Lake City and the
boundary of the district originally coincided with the municipal boundary.
However, the district has been considered to be unrestricted by Article XI,
Section 6, and it is presently wholesaling very large quantities of water to
other utilities in Salt Lake County. This institutional arrangement provides
considerable flexibility in use of water acquired by the city (through the
district) after creation of the district; but it is not helpful to a city whose
total right was acquired prior to formation of such a district.
Another common way of avoiding the restriction is to exchange water
rights. The courts have interpreted Article XI as allowing trades involving
unequal quantities or intermittent water flows so long as the water acquired
by the municipality has "equal value" to the water it disposes. Because of
differences in water quality this provides some flexibility in exchanges.
There are many situations, however, where such exchanges are not
possible, as illustrated by the following case studies.
Case Study No. 1-0eveland and Elmo, Utah:
The towns of Cleveland and Elmo in northern Emery County obtained
water systems by means of the WPA program during the 1930's. The
groundwater in this area contains too much salt to be suitable for culinary
use. These systems therefore obtain water from a local irrigation company,
the Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company. The water is diverted from a
canal at a point near each town and used without treatment except for
running it through small settling ponds. The quality of this water is
completely unsuitable for culinary use and the State Division of Health has
been attempting to get these communities to upgrade their systems for many
years.
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In 1967, a consultant was hired by a group oflocal residents to study the
domestic water needs of the area of northern Emery County. The engineer's
report indicated that the only source of suitable quality water for use without
complete treatment was the flow from several small springs in Huntington
Canyon, approximately 17 miles from Cleveland and 22 miles from Elmo.
The construction cost of transporting this water from the springs to either
town was completely prohibitive as an individual community project.
However, by creating a single water utility which could serve the entire
county area with one supply line from the canyon, it appeared that a feasible
project could be developed. An alternate solution, involving diverting water
closer to the service
{relltlng-it was considered but this· wOUIif have
cost more due to high operating costs and it would have continued the winter
icing problems in the canals.

area and

In order to proceed with the project as recommended by the consultant,
the local residents voted in 1970 to form a non-profit corporation called the
North Emery Water Users Association. The plan was to construct a system
costing $1,100,000, which would serve both the incorporated areas of
Cleveland and Elmo, the unincorporated community of Lawrence and the
largest possible number of farms in the area. The Association received almost
unanimous support from the local residents-both inside and outside the
incorporated areas-and soon more than 300 service connections had been
purchased. A substantial grant from the Economic Development Administration and the Four Corners Regional Commission permitted fmancing the
project at a reasonable cost to the users. A loan was obtained from the
Farmers Home Administration for most of the balance of non-grant funds.
The Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company holds the water rights to
virtually all of the flow from the Huntington Creek watershed. Since the
springs which were proposed for development are in this watershed, the
intent of the Association was to obtain the right to the spring· flow by
purchasing the necessary stock in the Irrigation Company and obtaining
permission from the State Division of Water Rights for a change of use and of
point of diversion. The two municipalities already had sufficient stock in the
irrigation company for their own residents (700 s1;tares) and it was the stated
intention of both municipalities to allow the Association to deliver water
represented by this stock through the proposed pipeline. It was believed that
only a change \pf point of diversion would be required to accomplish
tremendous increase in quality of water delivered to their residents. This
meant that the only stock that would have to be actually purchased by the
Association would be that for users outside the municipalities. This was
agreeable to the State Division of Water Rights, the towns, the Association,
and the Irrigation Company.
The question remained: What type of formal agreement would be
required between the towns and the Association in order to protect all the
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interests involved? Because of Article XI, Section 6, the towns could not sell
this stock to the Association. What was desired by all parties was a form of
lease agreement where the Association would be able to deliver the water to
the town users and bill them directly. The towns would still have to pay their
usual annual assessment to the irrigation company but the Association's lease
agreement would require it to reimburse the towns by an amount at least
equal to the annual water assessment. The Association's attorney and
engineer were well aware of the Constitutional prohibition on disposing of
mUnicipal water rights but believed that surely, in a situation where all parties
would obviOusly benefit, some type of lease agreement could be worked out
for this purpose. To the great consternation o( all parties, however, it was
finally determined that this could not be done. A short term renewable lease
was not agreeable to the attorneys for the federal fmancing agencies. Since
the project loan was to be fmanced over 40 years, these agencies insisted
upon a lease of at least this duration to assure tenure of the water right held
by the Association (and assigned to the federal government during the loan
period). A lease of that duration, however, was not constitutional because it
was interpreted by attorneys on both sides as amounting to disposing of the
water right.
The towns were therefore faced with the following spectacle: 1) They had
a water right sufficient for their needs in terms of quantity but very poor in
quality; 2) they had no apparent way to fmance, on their own, and means of
improving their water quality; 3) because of economies of scale, a water
association was able to deliver water to them which was completely
acceptable to the .Board of Health at an average monthly cost to their users of
$6/month compared to about $4 for the completely inadequate present
system, provided that the towns' share of the irrigation company's water
could be delivered through the Association's pipeline rather than the open
canal; 4) because of Article XI of the Constitution the necessary legal
arrangements could not be agreed upon and therefore the transfer could not
be made. This incredible situation occurred in spite of the fact that the water
would still have been used by the same families and the service to the towns
would have been guaranteed by a franchise agreement between the towns and
the Association. The Association would have had a stability guaranteed by
the administrative, legal, and financial interest of the federal financing
agencies, and the state agencies such as the Division of Health and Division of
Water Rights.
Clearly, the intent of the writers of the Constitution was not served in
this case; rather, the rigid municipal water right clause appeared to require
continuation of an intolerable situation in terms of public health.
A solution was finally worked out in the following manner: The
Association determined that the only course open to them short of
abandoning the project was to attempt to purchase additional irrigation
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company stock to replace the water planned to be furnished by the towns.
This was a very difficult task because of the shortage of water in the area and
because of the extra cost involved. The Association finally convinced enough
potential customers outside of the municipal areas to sell a portion of their
irrigation water and they purchased 768 shares rather than 165 shares. The
additional cost of $10,854 had to come from local Association funds since
neither the grant nor loan funds could be released until the water right was
acquired. This very nearly stopped the project since the local groups share
had· been almost completely used for preliminary engineering and right-ofway costs. After several months delay the additional funds were raised, the
stock sale was negotiated, and construction began in 1972.
The two towns now have no use for their 700 shares of stock in the
irrigation company. The market value of the stock at $18.00 per share is
$12,600 but they cannot sell it because of the constitutional restriction. They
now are faced with an annual operation and maintenance assessment from the
irrigation company of at least $875 in perpetuity for water which they
cannot use.
One recourse open to the towns appears to be to refuse payment of the
annual assessment. Over a period of time this would in reality constitute
abandonment of their ownership of this stock. The irrigation company could
then allow use of the water by other customers (perhaps even the domestic
water association). Certainly tenure by such a user, however, would be
uncertain and the value of the right would be much less than the market value
of other stock. This is an example of the extent of administrative and legal
gymnastics and the economic loss which municipalities in Utah are presently
experiencing as a result of Article XI, Section 6.

Case Study No. 2-Torrey, Utah:
The town of Torrey, Wayne County, Utah, has a population of
approximately 40 families. The town has over the years acquired water rights
for municipal use to the flow from several springs which are located in the
mountains above the town. Prior to 1968, the municipal water system
consisted of a distribution system which diverted water from Sand Creek at a
point near the town which was six miles from the springs which were the
source of the creek flow. This highly contaminated water was then used with
no treatment.
In 1967, the town hired a consultant to plan a program of improving their
water system. The resulting feasibility report indicated that development of
the springs at the source· and construction of a pipeline to the town was the
most economical method of upgrading the water quality. The town was able
to obtain a 50 percent grant from the Farmer's Home Administration to
apply to such a project, but even so, financing the balance of the construction
cost appeared hopeless for the small town.
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An apparent solution materialized in the form of the U.S. Forest Service.
The proposed pipeline was to be constructed over several miles of public
domain administered by the Forest Service. The right-of-way in fact went
through a proposed future campground. The Forest Service was in the process
of planning the campground facilities which were to include a culinary water
system. The solution was obvious; the Forest Service would assist in fmancing
the town system. In return, the town would allow the Forest Service to use a
small portion of its water supply by prOviding an outlet at the campground.
The town had approved applications from the State Division of Water
Rights to develop and use all of the flow from Indian Spring which was above
the forest campground. They also had the right to the flow from another
large spring in a higher canyon and other smaller rights. The basis for this
large water right was use for both municipal and irrigation purposes within
the town area. The total water right represented approximately 1100 gallons
per minute while the demand for municipal use was only about 40 gallons per
minute. Obviously, the town could have allowed a small portion of their
water to be used by the Forest Service and still have an ample reserve for even
an unexpected future population explosion.

It was at any rate an academic question, whether some tremendous future
growth in the area could possibly result in a municipal water shortage. At
some point during such growth an economic base would have been
established which could have fmanced water developments from other, more
distant sources, or treatment of local surface flow. The very real problem
facing the town board and the State Division of Health in 1967 was how to
finance a safe supply of drinking water for the 40 existing relatively low
income families.
Here again, Article XI, Section 6, very nearly scuttled the proposed
improvements. The town was informed by the USDA attorney, acting in
behalf of the funding agency that it could not sell or lease a part of its water
to the federal government. After considerable delay (which caused threatened
withdrawal of the 50 percent federal grant which had already been
appropriated) a solution was reached. The Forest Service claimed a diligence
right to a portion of the city's spring flow by virtue of grazing permits in the
area. The State Engineer and cattlemen who happened to be sympathetic to
the town's plight, allowed a questionable change of use for this water right
from stock watering to campground use. In this manner the town was finally
able to circumvent Section 6, and the project was finally allowed to proceed.
Case Study No.3-Bountiful City:
Bountiful City is one of the most rapidly growing cities on the Wasatch
Front. It presently acquires water from several local wells and from the Weber
Basin Water Conservancy District (WBWCD). It also has obtained rights to
flow from nearby Millcreek Canyon which it is not yet using.
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A recent planning study of the city's water system revealed that a large
savings could be made (present worth of more than $600,000) if the city
could dispose of its WBWCD water. The city had contIacted with the district
in 1960 to purchase 1000 acre-fect of treated water. The term of the contract
is 40 years. The increasing operation and maintenance costs charged by the
district have caused this source of supply to become much more expensive
than the two alternate sources. Because of the constitutional restriction,
however, they cannot lease this water to other communities during the
remainder of their contract. It is even doubtful that they can avoid renewing
the contract in the year 2000 because this may well be interpreted as
"disposing of an acquired water right."

RECOMMENDATIONS
It would appear that there is ample evidence that Article XI, Section 6, of
the Utah State Constitution is counter productive and that a constitutional
amendment is desirable.
One possible solution would be outright elimination of this section. A
second alternative would be to permit disposal of a municipal water right
only after a 2/3 vote by the city residents. A third solution would be to
require approval by the State Division of Water Rights, and/or the State
Division of Water Resources. This, however, may be unconstitutional itself.
Article VI, Section 29 provides that "the legislature shall not delegate to any
special commission, ... any power to make, supervise or interfere with any
municipal improvement, money, propert), or effects ... or to perform any
municipal functions." This sort of approval would therefore have to be
investigated carefully. It would appear, however, that the Division of Water
Rights is already exercising broad powers affecting municipal property when
it reduces the quantity of an approved water right application during the
process of "peIfecting" it.
Of the three alternate solutions suggested above, the second (voter
approval) would likely be most attractive to the voters of the state and
therefore most likely to accomplish approval of the constitutional amendment. It would eliminate the problems now associated with Article XI,
Section 6, and still retain a form of check and balance on the city officials
without interference by a state agency. This course of action is therefore
recommended.
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NOTE
Since Utah is the only state in the United States that has a constitutional
restraint prohibiting municipalities from disposing of water rights, no possible
harm could come to the municipalities if the first solution of Mr. Hughes
were recommended and accepted. Complete repeal of Article XI, Section 6
would probably be the best solution, therefore.
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